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The CERCLA's Daily Penalty and Treble
Damages Provisions: Is Any Cause
"Sufficient Cause" to Disobey an
EPA Order?
PATRICIA LINDAUER*

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 allows the EPA to order a
party to cleanup hazardouswaste before that party is found
liable. However, a party can disobey this order when there
is sufficient cause. This article discusses the instances
where sufficient cause has been found. Further,the author
determines whether the sufficient cause provision is a viable option for parties who have been ordered to cleanup.
The author concludes that sufficient cause may be useful,
although it is looked upon with skepticism.

I.

Introduction

In most financial matters, one only pays for what's received, and then only what one justly owes. Only a fool parts
with a dollar before he is sure that it needs to be spent. Typically we wait to find out what we owe rather than pay up
front and risk a fight to get all or part of it back.
* Associate Attorney at Klett Lieber Rooney & Schorling, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania.
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The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 19801 ("CERCLA"), however, is
extraordinary. Its scheme for cleanup of hazardous waste
sites by private parties compels parties to fund cleanup, despite any objections, before actual legal responsibility for the
costs is determined. A party's refusal to fund remediation
until liability is determined can mean exposure to enormous
penalties.
Under CERCLA's remediation scheme, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") may issue an administrative
order requiring parties to cleanup a hazardous waste site.
Recipients of such orders must comply or face daily fines and
punitive damages. In most cases, only after cleanup work is
completed will a party have an opportunity to contest
responsibility.
CERCLA does allow a party to disobey an order if it has
"sufficient cause" to do so. However, a recipient of an EPA
order, who relies on the sufficient cause defense does so at his
peril, since the defense is poorly defined and may be so limited that reliance on it could prove imprudent and costly.
This article explores the limitations of the sufficient cause defense through analysis of the statute and the resulting case
law.
II. The Statute
CERCLA gives the EPA authority to take action in response to releases of hazardous substances into the environment, and then seek reimbursement post-cleanup from
1. CERCLA § 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. 1989), as
amended by Act of Nov. 5, 1990, CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9611 (1988 &
West Supp. 1993). CERCLA was amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9674 (1988)) [hereinafter "SARA"]. Throughout this commentary, all statutory references will be to CERCLA unless otherwise indicated.
Authority granted to the President in CERCLA has been delegated to the
EPA. See Exec. Order No. 12,580, 3 C.F.R. 193-200 (1987). All subsequent references in this commentary to EPA authority under CERCLA refer to authority
originally delegated to the President.
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responsible parties. 2 Alternatively, the EPA can compel potentially responsible parties ("PRPs") to cleanup hazardous
3
waste sites via CERCLA section 106.12.
One vehicle used by the EPA to secure private remediation of hazardous waste sites is the administrative order. An
administrative order requires private parties associated with
a hazardous waste site to remedy conditions at the site if a
release or threat of a release of a hazardous substance may
endanger public health, welfare, or the environment. 4 Once
the EPA determines that an "imminent and substantial" endangerment exists, it has broad statutory authority to order a
party or parties to abate the danger or threat of danger.5 The
EPA considers administrative orders a primary enforcement
tool, since they provide incentives for PRPs to settle and
abide by deadlines, and can be used to force commencement
of cleanup efforts when a settlement cannot be reached. 6
Comparatively, negotiations for consent decree settlements,
an option open to the EPA in which the EPA and a PRP enter
into an agreement that the PRP will perform any response
2. CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988). The EPA can recover its costs for remedial actions only if the site is listed on the National Priority List ("NPL").
3. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). CERCLA allows the EPA
to take steps it determines necessary to force PRPs to undertake EPA-selected
cleanup actions as follows:
(a) ...[W]hen the President determines that there may be an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment because of an actual or threatened release
of a hazardous substance from a facility, he may require ... such
relief as may be necessary to abate such danger or threat, and the
district court of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction to

grant such relief as the public interest and the equities of the case
may require. The President may also. . . take other action under
this section including, but not limited to, issuing such orders as
may be necessary to protect public health and welfare and the
environment.
Id.
4. Id. In addition to administrative orders, the EPA can secure private
response work via a settlement embodied in a judicial consent decree or an injunction issued by a federal district court to compel cleanup. Id.
5. Id.
6. See Guidanceon CERCLA Section 106(a) UnilateralAdministrative Orders for Remedial Designs and Remedial Actions [1990 Administrative Materials] 20 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 35,253 [hereinafter "EPA Guidance"].
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action, 7 often drag on interminably, thus frustrating CERCLA's prompt cleanup policy. 8
Administrative orders, on the other hand, are usually
met with prompt compliance. With administrative orders, a
site may be cleaned up without depleting the Superfund, 9 and
the EPA's time and money need not be spent on a suit against
responsible parties for reimbursement. Thus, funds are conserved for government financed cleanups. 10
Under CERCLA section 106, the EPA need not show that
an endangerment actually exists, only that one may exist."
An endangerment need not be immediate or an emergency for
it to be "imminent."12 Indeed, a risk may be considered immi13
nent even if the health effects will be latent for many years.
Moreover, an endangerment may be "substantial" when rea7. CERCLA § 122(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a) (1988).
8. Walls v. Waste Resources Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985).
Moreover, Congress passed CERCLA to "provide a national inventory of inactive hazardous waste sites and to establish a program for appropriate environmental response action to protect public health and the environment from the
dangers posed by such sites." H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119.
9. CERCLA, The Superfund Act, was enacted by Congress for the sole purpose of compensating the public for damages caused by hazardous substances.
See WARREN FREEDMAN, HAZARDOUS WASTE LLABILrTY 212-13 (BNA Books The
Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 1992). Thus, CERCLA established a fund for
such compensation. The initial amount appropriated to this Superfund was
$1.6 million for a five-year period allocated for the sole purpose of cleaning up
hazardous waste sites throughout the United States. Id. at 214.
10. EPA Guidance, supra note 6, at 35,253. If the EPA performs cleanup
work itself with Superfund money, the money can be recovered by the Attorney
General bringing an action on behalf of the Fund under CERCLA section
112(c)(3). Id.
11. United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 192 (W.D.
Mo. 1985) (finding that a chemical landfill site containing known or suspected
carcinogens for which the recommended exposure level is zero and whose waste
material had the potential for migration via groundwater, surface water or air,
and posed the potential for exposure of humans and other living organisms in
the surrounding suburban and urban areas which included agricultural, residential and manufacturing areas warranted an injunction against the responsible parties).
12. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988).
13. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 697 F. Supp. 89, 90 (D. Conn. 1989) (finding that hazardous substances released from landfill and presenting significant
risk of migration through groundwater and leachate to nearby residential wells
and brooks where they may be ingested by humans and animals presented im-
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sonable cause for concern exists regarding exposure to a risk
of harm by a release or threatened release of a hazardous
14
substance.
Any person named in an administrative order best pay
attention, since Congress provided substantial penalties to
promote compliance. A PRP who, without "sufficient cause,
willfully violates, or fails, or refuses to comply with" an administrative order is subject to fines of up to $25,000 per
day. 15 These large daily fines for noncompliance may be enhanced by punitive damages. 16 Under CERCLA section
107(c)(3), a court may assess damages equal to three times
the amount of any costs incurred by the Superfund if a party
fails, without "sufficient cause," to take proper action pursu17
ant to an EPA order.
A recipient of an administrative order may believe that
because he doesn't have the finances necessary to undertake
the cleanup he has sufficient cause to refuse to comply. Or,
he may believe he is not responsible for the contamination
and the EPA has targeted the wrong person, or that the order
is based on mistaken conclusions or lacks merit. He may believe that someone else is also responsible. Perhaps he is lax
in complying because he is too busy with other matters or
hopes to stall the EPA. Or, maybe he just does not understand the significance of the whole matter. Regardless of
these beliefs, the recipient of an EPA administrative order
cannot challenge the validity of the order, its basis, or its requirements in a court of law prior to its enforcement.' 8 The
1986 amendments to CERCLA, in recognizing that a

minent and substantial endangerment to the public health, welfare or the
environment).
14. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. at 194.
15. CERCLA § 106(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1) (1988).
16. CERCLA § 107(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(c)(3) (1988).
17. Id. See e.g., United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp.
1030, 1039 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (court imposed treble damages for PRP's refusal to
remediate a site under an EPA order).
18. CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1988). Section 113(h) precludes
pre-enforcement review of section 106 orders.
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Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA") 19
pre-enforcement review would delay cleanup and increase
costs, preclude judicial review of the merits of a cleanup order
prior to an attempt by the EPA to enforce it.2° If PRPs refuse
to comply with an administrative order, the EPA has two
choices. First, it may use Superfund money to cleanup the
site and later initiate court proceedings to recover from the
PRP costs, punitive damages, 21 and penalties. 22 Second, the
EPA may compel compliance by bringing an action for judicial enforcement of the order 23 and seek penalties and punitive damages. Consequently, to be heard in court, a recipient
who disagrees with an order must wait for the EPA to initiate
judicial proceedings. 24 At that point, the recipient will be
19. In 1986, the government enacted SARA. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613 (1986). SARA "enhanced the federal government's ability to learn of the
releases of hazardous substances into the environment and to respond more
promptly to those unauthorized releases of hazardous waste." Freedman,supra
note 9, at 214. Congress provided $8.5 billion in funding for a 5 year period, to
cleanup 175 sites during the first three years and 200 more sites in the last two
years. Id.
SARA also expands and clarifies EPA's powers, encourages and facilities settlements, increases state government and public involvement in the process of cleanup, amends state statutes of limitation
for certain actions arising from exposure to hazardous substances
that might be barred, provides for limited indemnification at contractors, delineates the underground petroleum storage tank
problems, and deals effectively with damage to public natural resources and the adverse health effects of Superfund sites.
Id. at 215.
20. Id. Under CERCLA section 113(h), courts may review section 106 orders only when the EPA seeks to enforce the order, the EPA seeks penalties for
violation of the order, or the PRP seeks reimbursement from EPA of response
costs incurred after compliance with the order. CERCLA section 113(h) also
allows judicial review in the context of section 107 cost recovery actions, section
310 citizens suits, and section 106 injunctive action. CERCLA § 113(h), 42
U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1988). The scope of review for issues of adequacy of the response action taken or ordered by the EPA is narrowly limited to the administrative record, and upon review the court should uphold the EPA action unless
the opposing party can prove that the action taken was arbitrary or capricious.
CERCLA § 113(j)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(j)(1)-(2) (1988).
21. CERCLA § 107(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (1988).
22. CERCLA § 106(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1) (1988).
23. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988).
24. PRPs may comply with administrative orders without admitting liability for the response costs. CERCLA § 106(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(A)
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subject to daily penalties and punitive damages unless he can
25
prove he had "sufficient cause" to disobey.
III.

When is there "Sufficient Cause" to Disobey?

The phrase "sufficient cause" is not defined in CERCLA,
and only a few courts have addressed the issue. The case law
is scant, 26 which may be due to the fact that the EPA has only
recently employed administrative orders with any regularity.2 7 The increased use of administrative orders marks a
sharp shift from prior EPA policy which relied mainly on the
Superfund to finance cleanups, believing it was faster and
avoided lengthy and costly litigation. 28 Moreover, many administrative orders are never challenged, perhaps because
PRPs know that the federal judiciary is generally favorable to
29
CERCLA policy and the EPA's position.
(1988). A recipient who complies with an order issued under section 106 and is
later judged not liable will be reimbursed. CERCLA § 106(b)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9606(b)(2)(C) (1988). Recovery in such a claim is allowed if the PRP can show
by a preponderance of the evidence that it is not liable for the response costs.
CERCLA § 106(b)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(C) (1988). Recovery is also permitted if the PRP can show, on the administrative record, that the response
action required of him was arbitrary and capricious or was otherwise not in
accordance with law. CERCLA § 106(bX2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(bX2)(D) (1988).
25. CERCLA § 106(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1) (1988).
26. See Solid State Circuits v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency, 812 F.2d 383, 390 (8th Cir. 1991); Wagner Electric Corp. v. Thomas,
612 F. Supp. 736, 744 (D. Kan. 1985); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem.
Corp., 606 F. Supp. 412, 421 (D. Minn. 1985).
27. The EPA announced only in 1989, its "Enforcement First" policy in response to severe criticism of its failure to get tough with private parties. Since
1989, EPA officials have endeavored to meet this criticism by increasingly forcing private companies to bear the burden of cleanups, and reporting its increased enforcement efforts. See Environmental Protection Agency Reports
Increased Enforcement Efforts, More Money PaidBy Companies For Cleanups,
21 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1527 (Dec. 7, 1990). Accordingly, the EPA recently reported that it sought over $135,000,000 in civil and criminal penalties during
the fiscal year of 1992. PenaltiesAssessed: 1992, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,112 (Feb. 1993).
28. Environmental ProtectionAgency ChiefPledges to ForcePollutersto Pay
Rather than Rely on Trust for Cleanups, 20 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 428 (June 16,
1989).
29. See e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258 (3d
Cir. 1992) (CERCLA will be construed liberally to effectuate its goals, and
EPA's interpretation of statute will be given great deference); United States v.
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According to the EPA, a PRP who bears the burden of
proof has "sufficient cause" for noncompliance only if it has a
reasonable and good faith belief that it was: (1) not a liable
party to whom the order should have been issued; (2) that the
actions required in the order were inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan ("NCP")' or (3) that the EPA acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing the order.30 Furthermore, in the EPA's view, if a recipient fails to identify its concerns with an administrative order at the time it is issued, it
cannot make out a good faith "sufficient cause" defense
3
later. '
Legislative history, while scant, sheds some light on
what the drafters meant by "sufficient cause." Furthermore,
an examination of court decisions, reveals little about what
constitutes "sufficient cause." Instead, the decisions give a
better indication as to what will not satisfy the "sufficient
cause" criteria.
The phrase "sufficient cause" was discussed only once
during the original drafting of the statute. One Senator explained that the drafters intended that the phrase encompass
defenses such as those where the recipient of the order is not
a responsible party, or who "for good reason" believed he was
not a responsible party.3 2 Punitive damages should not be
assessed, or at least should be reduced "in the interest of equity," if a recipient of an order did not substantially contribute to the release or threatened release of hazardous
Gurley Ref. Co., 788 F. Supp. 1473, 1491 (E.D. Ark. 1992) (response costs are
conclusively presumed to be reasonable and thus recoverable under CERCLA).
30. See Solid State Circuits v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency, 812 F.2d 383, 390 (8th Cir. 1991); Wagner Electric Corp. v. Thomas,
612 F. Supp. 736, 744 (D. Kan. 1985); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem.
Corp., 606 F. Supp. 412, 421 (D. Minn. 1985); see also H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835,2864. See supra
note 25.
31. EPA Guidance, supra note 6, at 35,257. The EPA provides a conference
opportunity before the order becomes effective, and orders generally include a
requirement that the recipients notify the EPA of their intent to comply, accompanied by any basis for a sufficient cause defense. See infra notes 71-72 and
accompanying text.
32. 126 Cong. Rec. 30,986 (1980) (statement of Senator Stafford)
microformed on CIS No. 96/2:126/Pt. 23 (Congressional Info. Serv.).
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substances. Moreover, there could be "sufficient cause" for
non-compliance if the recipient "did not at the time have the
financial or technical resources to comply, or if no technological means for complying was available." 33 The drafters also
contemplated that a reviewing court would look into the propriety of the order itself. If the order or expenditures were
not proper, for example not consistent with the NCP, then
or they
certainly no punitive damages should be assessed
34
should be proportionate to the demands of equity.
A less specific and less permissive explanation was given
in 1986 when Congress added "sufficient cause" language to
section 106(b).35 Congress now anticipated that the phrase
would
continue to be interpreted to preclude the assessment of
penalties or treble damages when a party can establish
that it had a reasonable belief that it was not liable under
CERCLA or that the required response action was inconsistent with the [National Contingency Plan]. The court
must base its evaluation of the defendant's belief on the
objective evidence of the reasonableness and good faith of
that belief. Given the importance of EPA orders to the success of the CERCLA program, courts should carefully scrutinize assertions of "sufficient cause" and accept such a
defense only where a party can demonstrate by objective
evidence the reasonableness and good faith of a challenge
to an EPA order. The amendment also contemplates that
courts will continue to interpret "sufficient cause" to encompass other situations where the equities require that
36
no penalties or treble damages be assessed.

Before the 1986 amendments, courts generally held that
pre-enforcement review of the propriety of section 106 orders
33. Id.
34. Id.

35. "To avoid potential unfairness that might arise from the limitation on
the timing of review of section 106 orders, this amendment expressly extends

the 'sufficient cause' defense to the penalty provision in section 106." H.R. Rep.
No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835,

2864.
36. Id.
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was prohibited, since judicial review would only serve to delay prompt response action. 37 The inability to challenge administrative orders, however, implicates constitutional due
process violations as well. 38 An objective good faith standard
of "sufficient cause" was adopted by several courts3 9 so as to
ensure that the penalty provisions were constitutionally permissible. The Eighth Circuit, for example, rejected a due process challenge to the EPA's authority to seek treble damages
from a responsible person who, without sufficient cause,
failed to properly comply with an EPA cleanup order. 40 In
Solid State Circuits,Inc. v. United States EnvironmentalProtection Agency, 4 1 the recipients of an EPA order sued to enjoin
the EPA from enforcing the order it had issued. Meanwhile,
EPA performed the cleanup it had ordered the recipients to
undertake. The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction
to consider a challenge to the merits of the EPA order, but
that it did have jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality
of CERCLA's treble damage liability provision. 42 The court
held that, the "without sufficient cause" provision in the Act
afforded adequate due process protection by preventing the
assessment of treble damages if the opposing party had an
objectively reasonable basis for believing that the EPA order
37. E.g., Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 315 (2d Cir. 1986); Aminoil Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 599 F. Supp. 69, 71
(C.D. Cal. 1984).
38. See Industrial Park Dev. Co. v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency, 604 F. Supp. 1136, 1141 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (the court ruled that the failure of CERCLA to provide either pre-deprivation or prompt post-deprivation
hearing upon the enforcement of 106(a) orders could violate due process rights).
The statutory scheme for issuing administrative orders has been challenged
under the takings clause as well. See Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d at
315-17 (most challenges to the penalty provisions of CERCLA alleged due process violations). See also United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 606 F.
Supp. at 418 (D. Minn. 1984).
39. Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency, 812 F.2d 383, 391 (8th Cir. 1987); Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800
F.2d 310 at 319; United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 606 F. Supp. at
418.
40. Solid State Circuits,812 F.2d at 391.
41. Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency, 812 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1987).
42. Id. at 386.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss2/4

10

1994]

CERCLA'S DAILY PENALTY

43
at issue was either invalid or inapplicable to it.
In assessing the objective reasonableness of a challenge to an EPA
cleanup order, the EPA will be presumed to have acted correctly and its decision to issue an order may be found erroneous only if it acted arbitrarily or capriciously. 44 A party
would have to show that CERCLA, EPA regulations, or any
hearings or guidance the EPA may provide, gave rise to an
objectively reasonable belief in the invalidity or inapplicabil45
ity of the cleanup order.
In addition to Solid State Circuits,other pre-amendment
decisions addressing constitutional challenges construed
"sufficient cause" to mean that treble damages may not be
imposed when a challenge to the proposed remedy is made in
good faith by a defendant who reasonably believes that it has
a valid defense to the government order. 4 6 In United States v.
Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp.,47 for example, the defendant contended that the remedial action the EPA had ordered was far
more expensive than what was required. The court held that
the defendant could challenge the order without being subjected to exorbitant penalties even if the challenge is ultimately rejected on the merits, provided the challenge was
made in good faith. 48 A more PRP-sensitive view of sufficient
cause was espoused in Aminoil, Inc. v. United States,49 where
the court said punitive damages under section 107(c)(3) may
only be assessed where the government proves that a PRP
has refused to comply with an administrative order in bad
50
faith.
While these cases provided some comfort to well-intentioned PRPs, they provide little insight as to what would con-

43. Id. at 391.
44. Id. at 392.
45. Id. at 392.
46. Wagner Electric Corp. v. Thomas, 612 F. Supp. 736, 744-45 (D. Kan.
1985); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 412, 421 (D.
Minn. 1985); see also H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 82, reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2864.
47. 606 F. Supp. at 415.
48. Id. at 420.
49. 646 F. Supp. at 294.
50. Id. at 299.
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stitute sufficient cause, or what beliefs would be considered
in good faith or reasonable. Moreover, these cases were decided before the 1986 amendments. The pre-amendment
courts were quick to establish a good faith defense to both
section 106(a) daily fines and section 107(c)(3) treble damages in efforts to satisfy due process. SARA 51 not only codified the bar on pre-enforcement review of administrative
orders, but quelled the due process problem with section
113(h) and additions to section 106. Section 106 was
amended to allow parties complying with an administrative
order to obtain reimbursement for reasonable compliance
costs incurred, plus interest, if the parties can show they are
not liable for response costs under section 107(a) or that the
government's decision to issue the order was arbitrary and
capricious.5 2 In addition, the amendments restrict the timing
of judicial review, thereby deferring all challenges to EPA orsuit for reimbursement is brought
ders until an enforcement
53
by the government.
Thus it remains to be seen whether court determinations
of "sufficient cause" will show any tolerance for non-complying parties. Based on the tone of two courts that have specifically considered parties' reasons for disobeying EPA orders, it
appears that few, if any, excuses will be accepted.
For example, despite Senator Stafford's remarks in 1980,
at least two courts have refused to accept PRPs' "sufficient
cause" defenses based on financial inability. 54 In United
States v. Parsons,55 the EPA issued an administrative order
requiring several parties to cleanup drums containing hazardous substances. The recipients of the orders refused to
comply, claiming, among other things, a lack of involvement
51. See supra note 19.
52. See supra note 20.
53. Section 113(h) does not totally bar review, but delays review until the
EPA brings enforcement actions. Thus, since review is available, the due process clause is satisfied. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
54. United States v. Lecarreaux, No. Civ. 90-1672, 1991 WL 341191, at *18,
*26 (D. N.J. July 30, 1991); United States v. Parsons, 723 F. Supp. 757, 763
(N.D. Ga. 1989).
55. 723 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
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with the site and financial inability. 56 In the district court's
view, financial ability cannot serve as a "sufficient cause" defense because, from a policy standpoint, one should consider
one's financial risks before becoming involved in transporting
and disposing potentially hazardous materials.5 7 As to the
parties' disagreement on when cleanup began, the court ruled
that punitive damages should not be assessed when the EPA
begins its own cleanup operations before a PRP has a chance
58
to comply with an EPA order.
59
Likewise, the defendant in United States v. Lecarreaux,
when faced with an action by the United States for assessment of daily penalties and punitive damages, argued that
his lack of financial resources gave him sufficient cause not to
comply with an EPA administrative order that directed him
and 34 other parties to cleanup a contaminated site. Despite
the defendant's assertion that he was on the brink of insolvency, the court, while noting that the defendant provided no
concrete evidence of his financial status, rejected the defense
and followed the public policy reasoning advanced by the Parsons court.6 0 In granting summary judgment for the United

States on the issue of punitive damages under 107(c)(3) and
daily penalties under 106(b)(1), the court, also rejected the defendant's other attempts to establish sufficient cause.
Although held liable as a PRP in an earlier proceeding, the
defendant asserted that at the time he failed to comply with
EPA's order, he was relying in good faith on statutory defenses under which he believed that he was not liable for removal costs. 6

1

Specifically, he believed he was not liable

because a fire, as an Act of God, was the sole cause of the
release of hazardous substances. The court concluded that
since the defendant had been found liable under CERCLA,
his good faith defense was not reasonable. 62 The court cited
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Parsons, 723 F. Supp. at 763.
Parsons, 723 F. Supp. at 763-64.
Id. at 763.
No. Civ. 90-1672, 1991 WL 341191, at *18 (D.N.J. July 30, 1991).
Id. at *26.
Id. at *25.
Id. at *26.
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the 1986 legislative history suggesting that courts should
"carefully scrutinize" assertions of sufficient cause. The court
held that consideration of the equities would not work to prevent the assessment of punitive damages in this case. 63 The
court went so far as to suggest that only in a situation like
that mentioned in Parsons, where the EPA undertakes the
cleanup before the recipient of the order has a chance to comply, would the equities require that no penalties or treble
damages be assessed.64
IV.

Conclusion

Although the parameters of "sufficient cause" have not
yet been clearly defined, it is safe to conclude that a recipient
of an EPA cleanup order has little choice but to comply. Only
if the PRP is absolutely certain that he is not a responsible
party under CERCLA, 65 or that he has a defense to CERCLA
liability, should he dare to disobey.
The EPA has unfettered statutory discretion to dictate
the requirements, method of removal or remediation, and the
level of cleanup required at a site by issuing an administrative order. Judicial review of the order is postponed until after the response action is taken. Although a recipient of an
order may be reimbursed for costs incurred once cleanup is
completed if a court finds that he is not liable under CERCLA
or that the costs were not proper under the NCP, any such
reimbursement could take years and will cost the PRP even
more.
Additionally, courts are usually steadfast to further the
route contemplated by the statute and will not look favorably
upon a PRP who refuses to comply with a cleanup order.
With the government's "pay now, complain later" procedure,
its speedy cleanup policy is accomplished and PRPs' argu63. Id. at *27.
64. Id. at *27.
65. It should be noted that the language of section 106(a) does not limit
issuance of orders only to covered persons as defined in CERCLA section 107(a).
According to EPA, that language grants EPA broad authority to issue an order
to any party. For example, the EPA may issue an order to an adjoining landowner to obtain access to the site. EPA Guidance, supra note 6, at 35,255.
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ments concerning liability or appropriateness of the order
must wait until another day. More likely than not only the
most innocent of PRPs - those found not liable under CERCLA or those who successfully assert a section 107(b) defense
will have sufficient cause to balk at the established procedure. If a recipient thinks he may not be responsible, he had
better think again, and if a recipient does not have the money
to comply, he had better find it quick.
Assertions of "sufficient cause" will be viewed with a
much more skeptical eye than that of the pre-amendment
cases. The Lecarreaux decision, for example, is contrary to
the reasoning of the pre-amendment cases. The Reilly Tar
court stated that a PRP should be able to defend himself at
an enforcement proceeding without being forced to pay penalties, even if his defense is ultimately rejected.6 6 Yet the defendant in Lecarreaux was punished with costs (over
$200,000),67 daily penalties and punitive damages68 precisely
because his Act of God6 9 defense had been rejected and he
had been found liable under CERCLA. Under this kind of
analysis, "sufficient cause" will not be met when a party in
good faith asserts a defense to CERCLA liability that is ultimately rejected by the court. Despite a PRP's honest belief
that it is not liable, the PRP is subject to enormous penalties
if a court deems its belief to be unreasonable. In short, while
the drafters of the "sufficient cause" language said noncompliance could be "for good reason,"70 it will be up to a court to
decide what is (or is not) a good reason. Since disobedience of
an order places PRPs at the mercy of judicial discretion, even
the most litigious of PRPs will not want to risk treble damages and daily fines.
Moreover, EPA policy itself has probably contributed to
diluting or even removing the sufficient cause defense. At
least two courts, in considering the constitutionality of CER66. 606 F. Supp. 412, 415 (D. Minn. 1985).
67. These numbers were not calculated by the court, but left to determination by the magistrate. Lecarreaux, 1991 WL 341191, at * 29.
68. Id. at *23.
69. CERCLA § 107(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1) (1988).
70. See supra note 32.
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CLA's penalty provisions, have suggested that informal hearings held by EPA prior to the order's compliance date could
remove or greatly limit a PRP's good faith or sufficient cause
defense. 7 1 EPA subsequently adopted a policy whereby its
administrative orders will specify that the recipient should
provide EPA with notice of, and the basis for, any sufficient
cause defense upon receipt of the order. 72 Additionally, all
PRPs will have an "opportunity to confer" with EPA regarding the order.73 The availability of a conference with EPA,
albeit limited by time constraints, may take the reasonableness out of a PRPs reliance on his defense, if he continues to
rely on the defense after the conference or if he does not take
advantage of the conference opportunity.
Finally, the EPA's use of section 106 orders will likely
increase. The EPA announced in 1989 that it would begin an
aggressive effort to force polluters to pay for cleaning up hazardous waste sites.7 4 Implementation of this "Enforcement
First" policy marked a shift from past policy that relied
chiefly on the Superfund to finance cleanups. 75 The new policy has led to a more active effort by the EPA to routinely
issue orders to PRPs to pay for cleanup work before judicial
action is sought. 76 That, coupled with fierce judicial deference to EPA discretion, should be a warning to recipients of
EPA orders not to rely on the sufficient cause defense.

71. Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency, 812 F.2d 383, 392 (8th Cir. 1987); Wagner Electric Corp. v. Thomas,
612 F. Supp. 736, 749 (D. Kan. 1985).
72. EPA Guidance, supra note 6, at 35,257.
73. Id. PRPs will have up to ten days from the date the order is mailed to
request a conference. Id.
74. Environmental Protection Agency Reports Increased Enforcement Efforts, More Money Paid By Companies for Cleanups, supra note 27, at 1527.
75. ChiefPledges, supra note 28, at 428.
76. Environmental Protection Agency, A Management Review of the
Superfund Program 2-6 (1989).
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